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FEDERAL CONTROL OVER USE OF COERCED CONFESSIONS IN STATE CRIMINAL CASES-SOME
UNSETTLED PROBLEMS
AUSTIN W.

SCOTT, JR.t

In recent years the United States Supreme Court has decided a
number of cases involving application of the due process clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment to the use of coerced confessions in state criminal trials.' Confessions obtained by violence or threats of violence, and
even confessions secured by interrogation conducted under certain circumstances, 2 are barred by the due process clause. This discussion is
j*Associate Professor of Law, University of Colorado.

1. The principal cases, in chronological order, are: Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S.
278 (1936); Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227 (1940); White v. Texas, 310 U.S. 530
(1940); Lisenba v. California, 314 U.S. 219 (1941); Ward v. Texas, 316 U.S. 547
(1942) ; Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U. S. 143 (1944), 327 U.S. 274 (1946); Lyons v.
Oklahoma, 322 U.S. 596 (1944); Malinski v. New York, 324 U.S. 401 (1945); Haley
v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596 (1948); Lee v. Mississippi, 332 U.S. 742 (1948); Watts v.
Indiana, 338 U.S. 49 (1949); Turner v. Pennsylvania, 338 U.S. 62 (1949); Harris v.
South Carolina, 338 U.S. 68 (1949) ; Gallegos v. Nebraska, 342 U.S. 55 (1951) ; Stroble
v. California, 343 U.S. 181 (1952); Stein v. New York, 346 U.S. 156 (1953). See
Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952).
2. E.g., persistent interrogation, especially if by relays of interrogators; unpleasant
place of confinement; interference with rest and sleep; lack of proper food; absence
of advice as to right to remain silent; imprisonment incommunicado without access to

INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
not concerned with a determination of what conduct amounts to coercion
or how coercion is proved. Rather, the problem is: Assuming that the
confession is proved to be coerced, should the federal courts forbid its
use by the states in some situations not yet passed upon by the United
States Supreme Court? In order to resolve problems presented by these
new situations, it will be necessary to have an understanding of the
rationale underlying the coerced confession cases.
Trustworthiness. The most universally accepted reason for excluding coerced confessions from criminal trials is that as evidence they are
unreliable, as likely to be false as true. 3 This is Wigmore's sole
test. 4 Most of the cases which have spelled out the reasons for excluding

coerced confessions have done so on this ground ;5 and the United States
Supreme Court has accepted this explanation as a reason why due process
forbids states to use such confessions. 6 Is it the sole reason?
Police deterrence. A second argument sometimes advanced is that
the true reason, or at least an additional one, for excluding coerced
confessions is to restrain police investigators from illegal conduct designed to extort confessions from recalcitrant suspects. 7 Although this
principle has been denied by Wigmore,8 the United States Supreme
Court has recently advanced it as an additional reason for applying the
due process clause to coerced confessions in state cases. 9 The device
of using rules of evidence to deter state officials from obnoxious conduct
family, friends, or counsel; failure to take suspect before a magistrate for a preliminary examination. All or some of these factors may add up to a "total situation"
amounting to "torture of mind" or "psychological torture." Watts, Turner, and Harris
cases, supra note 1.
3. Even noncoerced confessions are thought by most courts to be subject to enough
danger of untrustworthiness to require corroboration to warrant conviction, WIGMORE,
EVIDENCE §§ 2070-71 (3d ed. 1940), many requiring that the corpus delicti be independently established, id. at § 2071 and n.4 thereto.
4. Id. at § 822.
5. Id. at § 822 and n.2 thereto. Wigmore was a strong opponent of the use of
rules of evidence to discipline police officials. See also Waite, Police Regulation by
Rules of Evidence, 42 MICH. L. REV. 679 (1944).
6. See Lisenba v. California, 314 U.S. 219, 236 (1941) (reason is "to exclude false
evidence," and "there is a fair risk the confession is false") ; Stein v. New York, 346
U.S. 156, 182, 192 (1953) ("too untrustworthy to be received as evidence of guilt";
"illusory and deceptive evidence").
7. Perlman, Due Process and the Admissibility of Evidence, 64 HARv. L. Rxv. 1304,

1309 (1951).
8. WI GmoRE, EVIDENCE § 823 and cases cited at n.2 thereto.
9. See Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 173 (1952) : Use of coerced confessions
in state criminal cases "is constitutionally obnoxious not only because of their unreliability. They are inadmissible under the Due Process Clause even though statements contained in them may be independently established as true. Coerced confessions
offend the community's sense of fair play and decency." See also Watts v. Indiana, 338
U.S. 49, 50 n.2 (1949).
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has been employed under the due process clause by the Supreme Court
in other situations."0
Self-incrimination. A third principle advanced as a basis for excluding coerced confessions is that their use violates the privilege against
self-incrimination found in the federal and most state constitutions. Wigmore vigorously denies that the privilege applies to confessions extorted
by police officials," but other leading writers on evidence just as positively assert its applicability. 1 2 There are conflicting state and federal
cases, 13 but the Supreme Court has never suggested this as a possible
theory for excluding coerced confessions in state criminal cases. Even
if the rationale for excluding forced confessions in federal criminal trials
is based partly or wholly on the Fifth Amendment privilege, there is a
difficulty in incorporating this aspect of the privilege into the due process
clause of the Fourteenth in view of past Supreme Court decisions.' 4
10. To exclude trustworthy evidence forced from the defendant's stomach by
forceable use of the stomach pump, Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952). To
exclude knozing use of perjured testimony by state prosecutors, e.g., Mooney v.
Holohan, 294 U.S. 103 (1935), but apparently not the unkowing use thereof, Hysler
v. Florida, 315 U.S. 411 (1942). (Since the testimony is equally untrustworthy whether
used knowingly or unknowingly, its exclusion must be to deter the prosecutor from bad
conduct.) On the other hand, the Supreme Court has refused to use the due process
clause to deter state officials from objectionable conduct in other cases: Wolf v. Colorado,
338 U.S. 25 (1949) (evidence obtained by an illegal search and seizure); Frisbie v.
Collins, 342 U.S. 519 (1952) (jurisdiction obtained by kidnapping from another state);
Schwartz v. Texas, 344 U.S. 199 (1952) (illegal wiretapping).
The Supreme Court's utilization of procedural rules to discipline federal law enforcement officials has been applied even more widely, of course, in federal criminal trials:
to prevent unreasonable searches and seizures, Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383
(1914) ; to prevent entrapment, Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435 (1932) (Roberts,
J., concurring opinion) ; to force a prompt preliminary examination, McNabb v. United
States, 318 U.S. 332 (1943).
11. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 823.
12. AmERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, MODEL CODE OF EVIDEN cE, Rules 203, 232 (1942);
MAGUIRE, CoMMON SENSE AND COMION LAW 121 (1947);

MORGAN AND

MAGUIRE,

CASES ON EVIDENCE 425-427 (3d ed. 1951); McCormick, The Scope of Privilege in
the Law of Evidence, 16 TEx. L. REv. 447, 451-457 (1938); Morgan, The Privilege
Against Self-Incrimination, 34 MINN. L. REV. 1, 27-30 (1949).
13. E.g., state cases cited, MORGAN AND MAGUIRE, op. cit. supra note 12, at 426
n.6. For federal cases, see Rutledge, J., in Wood v. United States, 128 F.2d 265 (D.C.
Cir. 1942) (dictum that privilege does not apply to coerced confessions); Brain v.
United States, 168 U.S. 532 (1897) (self-incrimination clause of Fifth Amendment
excludes coerced admissions in federal courts); see also United States v. Carignan, 342
U.S. 36, 41 (1951).
14. Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46 (1947); Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S.
78 (1908), holding that even if the Fifth Amendment's privilege against self-incrimination prevents comment by the judge or prosecutor in federal cases on the defendant's
refusal to take the witness stand, the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment does not forbid a state judge or prosecutor from doing so in a state criminal trial.
It is possible, however, that other sorts of violations of the privilege against selfincrimination (other than comment on failure of the accused to testify) may be in

contravention of the Fourteenth Amendment.
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Those writers who contend that the privilege against self-incrimination supports the rule excluding coerced confessions (even assuming they
would make the theory a basis of federal control, by virtue of the due
process clause, over state confessions) do not imply that this is necessarily the sole basis; doubtless they believe that the trustworthiness and
perhaps deterrence principles also support the exclusion.
The task remains of applying the foregoing principles underlying
the coerced confession cases to the following state court situations as
yet not passed upon (or at least still unsettled) by the Supreme Court.
Use of coerced confession againstnonconfessor.
A confession improperly extorted from A may contain passages
implicating his confederate B, who may' 5 or may not 16 be a codefendant
with A. May a state, in view of the due process clause, introduce this
confession as evidence against B ?
Where A is not being tried jointly with B, the use of A's confession
implicating B is so obviously hearsay that a state is not likely to permit
its use as evidence against B. If it should overlook the hearsay rule
and allow the evidence, the mere fact that it violates the hearsay rule
would not contravene the due process clause.' 7 Where the confession has
been coerced, however, it would violate the due process clause on the
trustworthiness principle; for if the confession is untrustworthy evidence
when used against A, the same confession is hardly more trustworthy
when used against B. Insofar as coerced confessions are excluded to
prevent police misconduct, they should also be excluded here; otherwise
there is an incentive for officials to extort a confession implicating a
confederate.' 8
15. Stein v. New York, 346 U.S. 156, 194-196 (1953); Malinski v. New York,

324 U.S. 401, 410-412 (1945).
16. Turner v. Pennsylvania, 338 U.S. 62, 65-66 (1949).
17. See Stein v. New York, 346 U.S. 156, 196 (1953): "The hearsay-evidence
rule . . . will not be read into the Fourteenth Amendment." That state rules of
evidence are not generally within the scope of the Fourteenth Amendment, see Scott,
Federal Restrictiots on Evidence in State Criminal Cases, 34 MINN. L. REv. 489 (1950).
18. The Court, in Turner v. Pennsylvania, 338 U.S. 62, 65-66 (1949), did not
have to decide the due process question here considered, although it raised the question.
A different question is presented when A is coerced by improper means to appear
at B's trial and testify against B. WIGmORE, EvIDENCE § 815 n.3, suggests that A may
testify although the coercion aspects may be brought out on examination. Wigmore's
suggestion that the coercive pressure is removed once the witness appears in court
(since the court will protect him) is not borne out in the analogous case of a coerced
guilty plea, which constitutes a denial of due process. Waley v. Johnston, 316 U.S.
101 (1942). And the practice of coercing witnesses approaches the situation of the
prosecutor's knowing use of perjured testimony, a clear violation of due process. See
note 10 supra. Perhaps the state of mind of the prosecutor who improperly coerces a
witness into testifying against another is not that he knows the testimony is false,

COMMENT
The more common situation is where A and B are tried jointly. The
fact that A has confessed, implicating B who has not confessed, may
entitle B to a separate trial on his motion to sever, although most states
hold that a ruling on the motion is within the discretion of the trial court
and that a denial of the motion is not an abuse of discretion. 19 What if
the motion to sever is not made or, if made, is properly denied? It is
common to introduce A's confession implicating B but to instruct the
jury not to consider it against B20 or (less frequently) to delete B's
name wherever mentioned in A's confession. 2 ' The Supreme Court has
held that such state practices are not violations of due process even where
A's confession is coerced. 22 The theory is that since the jury presumably
followed instructions (or did not suspect that the mysterious unnamed
confederate was B), A's confession no matter how wrongfully obtained
could not hurt B. 23 If, however, the jury was not instructed to avoid
using A's confession against B (or some other device used to shield B),
the fact that A's confession was coerced should constitute a violation of
due process as to B on the principles of untrustworthiness or police deterrence, 24 unless perhaps B requested no such instruction or device. 25
but that he knows he does not know whether it is true or false-possibly a slightly
more commendable frame of mind.
19. See AMERICAN LAw INSTITUTE, CODE OF CRIM NAL PROCEDuRE § 312 (1931)
and commentary thereon, listing states where in such circumstances defendant is entitled
to a severance as a matter of right and states where severance rests in the trial judge's
discretion. See also Notes, 70 A.L.R. 1171, at 1186 (1931), 104 A.L.R. 1519, at 1523.
(1936), 131 ALR. 917, at 924 (1941).
20. As done in Stein v. New York, 346 U.S. 156, 194-196 (1953). See also id. at
173-174 n.17. See AMERICAN DIGEST SYSTEM, "Criminal Law," Key Nos. 528, 673(4),
for numerous cases holding that A's confession is hearsay as to co-defendant B (unless
B was present when A confessed and agreed to it or made no objection) but that it
is proper to use it against A with instructions to the jury to disregard it as to B.
21. As done in Malinski v. New York, 324 U.S. 401, 410-412 (1945), where "X's"
were substituted for B's name Wherever mentioned.
22. Malinski v. New York, supra note 21. See Stein v. New York, 346 U.S. 156,
194-196 (1953).
23. Stein v. New York, 346 U.S. 156 (1953), holds constitutional state procedure
which leaves to the jury the problem of deciding whether the confession was coerced;
if coercion is established, the jury is instructed to disregard the confession and decide
according to the other evidence. Thus, it is not a violation of due process to furnish
the jury with a coerced confession and instruct them to close their eyes to it. But
Rutledge, J., dissenting as to B in Malinski v. New York, 324 U.S. 401, 430-432 (1945),
thought that the "X's" so obviously referred to B that the fact that A's confession
was coerced should warrant reversal as to B as well as A.
24. Cf. Anderson v. United States, 318 U.S. 350, 356 (1943), a federal prosecution,
wherein A's improperly secured confession (under the McNabb rule, Yupra note 10)
implicating B led to reversal as to B as well as A since the jury was not instructed
to consider A's confession against A alone.
25. Where the judge did not limit the use of A's confession so as to shield
co-defendant B, but B never requested such limitation at the trial, may B raise the
question of denial of due process in a federal court, not having taken steps to protect
himself in the state trial court? In Jones v. State, 185 Md. 481, 45 A.2d 350 (1946),
the court said that where A confessed implicating B, but B failed to ask that A's
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In analogous situations it has been held that one person cannot, at

his trial, take advantage of the violation of another's rights. Thus, it
may be that B, not a party to the telephone conversation between A and
C overheard by reason of illegal wiretapping, may not object to the
introduction of evidence against him obtained thereby ;26 B may not
object to evidence against him obtained through an illegal search and
seizure by the police of A's (not B's) premises. 27 Such decisions are at
odds with the police-deterrence theory of exclusion of evidence, and the
Supreme Court may not follow them when these problems arise in that
Court; but at all events, in these cases the evidence involved was trustworthy, unlike the usual situation where A's coerced confession implicates B as well as A.
Use of evidence discovered by coerced confession.
Although all courts hold that a coerced confession (without more)
is inadmissible in evidence against the confessor, apparently they would
not hesitate to admit evidence discovered by means of such a confes.sion. 2 8 Wigmore and some courts go further and admit not only the
discovered facts but also the whole confession when thus verified by
finding evidence (the gun, the booty, the body) where the confessor
stated he hid it.29 Other courts admit (in addition to the discovered
evidence) only that part of the confession so verified, 30 and still others
admit no part of the confession but only the fact that evidence was discovered as a consequence of information furnished by the confessor."'
If the rationale excluding coerced confessions were solely that of
trustworthiness, then of course the facts discovered by such means (and
doubtless, as Wigmore suggests, the whole confession) should be adconfession be limited to A, the trial judge later properly refused to strike out of A's
confession all reference to B. Suppose that the confession in question had been coerced?
In general, constitutional rights may be knowingly waived. Perhaps B's chances of
successfully urging a denial of due process would depend on showing that he was
unrepresented by counsel, Gibbs v. Burke, 337 U.S. 773 (1949); Townsend v. Burke,
334 U.S. 736 (1948), or, if so represented, that this mistake proves his counsel to
have been woefully incompetent, Scott, snpra note 17, at 503-504.
26. See Goldstein v. United States, 316 U.S. 114 (1942), which does not, however,
go this far since it merely prevented B's objection to the testimony of A and C who
turned state's evidence on being confronted with the record of their tapped conversation.
27. United States v. Ebeling, 146 F.2d 254 (2d Cir. 1944); Note, 58 YALE LJ.

144 (1948).
28. WIGMoRE, EVIDENCE § 859; 22 C.J.S. 1454 n.20 (1940); McQueen v. Commonwealth, 196 Ky. 227, 244 S.W. 681 (1922); State v. Cocklin, 109 Vt. 207, 194 Atl. 378
(1937).

29.

WIGMORE, EVIDENCE

30. Ibid.
31. Id. at § 858.

§ 857.

COMMENT
missible. But if, as the Supreme Court has said, the exclusion of involun-"
tary confessions is based in part on a rationale of police deterrence, then
not only the confession (in whole or in part) but the discovered facts
themselves should be inadmissible; otherwise there is still strong incentive for law enforcement officials unlawfully to force a confession from
a suspect.32 The Supreme Court has stated quite clearly (although in
dicta) that the due process clause forbids use at a state trial of a confession even though statements contained therein are independently
established as true.33 It would seem that not only the whole confession
but also the verified part and even the discovered facts apart from the
confession are in danger of exclusion by the Court. 34
Use of coerced admission.
Some courts have drawn a distinction between a "confession" and
an "admission" and have held that the latter is admissible in evidence
even if coerced, 35 leaving to the jury the determination of the weight to
be given such an admission. Some courts define "confession" as a statement admitting all the essential elements of a crime; anything less is an
admission only, not subject to the rules regarding confessions."6 Others
(and Wigmore) define confession more broadly to include a statement admitting any essential part of the crime. 37 A number of states (and Wigmore) do not apply coerced confession rules to admissions of doing the
act charged if coupled with a defense negating guilt-such as, "I killed
him, but I did it in self-defense. '8 8 Practically all courts exclude from
the term "confession" (and from the rules regarding coerced confessions) admission of facts not constituting an essential element of the
crime charged but which may tend to tie the accused in with the crime32. AmEEICAN LAW INSTITUTE, op. cit. supra note 12, at Rule 243, states: "There is a
well-founded belief that in the cases where the police use forbidden means to obtain
confessions, they do so more for the purpose of discovering clues than for the purpose
of manufacturing admissible evidence."
33. See note 9 supra.
34. The wiretapping cases in the federal courts are analogous; not only the overheard conversations but also the clues discovered thereby are inadmissible in evidence
in federal trials. Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338 (1939) (the discovered
clues are "the fruit of the poisonous tree").
35. Cases are collected in MORGAN AND MAGUIR, op. cit. supra note 12, at 528
n.28; 22 C.J.S. 1250 (1940); e.g., People v. Trawick, 78 Cal. App.2d 604, 178 P.2d 45
(1947); Commonwealth v. Haywood, 247 Mass. 16, 141 N.E. 571 (1923); State v.
Gibson, 69 N.D. 70, 284 N.W. 209 (1939). Cf. Louette v. State, 152 Fla. 495, 12
So.2d 168 (1943) (same test as to coerced admissions as with confessions).
36. AmEIwcAN LAW INSTITUTE, Op. cit. supra note 12, at Rule 239.
37. Id. at Rule 505; WIGMOP, EvimENcE § 821.
38. AmECAN LAW INSTITUTE, op. cit. supra note 12, at Rule 239; WIGMORE, EviDENCE

§ 821 (exculpatory statements).
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such as admitting ownership of the weapon used to commit a crime or
9
admitting presence at a certain time and place.A
Does a state deprive the defendant of due process if it allows in
evidence coerced statements admitting an essential part of the crime
charged (but not the whole guilt), admitting all the essential elements
of the crime but coupling the statement with a defense negativing guilt,
or admitting some fact which may tend to connect the defendant with
the crime charged? The Supreme Court has not given a clear answer
since most of the cases coming to the Court from the state courts were
cases of confessions admitting all elements of the crime charged. 40 However, one case does hold that under the circumstances of the case a statement denying guilt but admitting knowledge of the crime comes under
41
the coerced confession rules of the due process clause.
On principle it would seem that incriminating statements extorted
from a suspect by coercive means should be treated in the same manner
as coerced confessions admitting guilt. Applying the test of trustworthiness, a damaging admission which has been coerced is as likely to be
unreliable as a coerced confession. On the police-deterrence principle, if
such admissions are allowed, the police are encouraged to use uncivilized
means to extort admissions to aid in the prosecution. If the privilege
against self-incrimination is a proper basis for the rule excluding coerced
confessions, admissions of facts tending to incriminate the defendant
(i.e., facts constituting much less than total guilt or even an essential
element of the crime) would be excluded.
Use of confession coerced by others.
So far the Supreme Court has dealt only with confessions coerced
by law enforcement officials of the state which has jurisdiction over the
crime charged. What if the unlawful coercion is applied by private persons (e.g., private detectives or a mob) or by the police of another jurisdiction? If such persons were cooperating with or instigated by the
prosecuting state officials, to use the confession as evidence would clearly
violate due process. 4 2 What if they obtained the confession on their own
initiative?
39. AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, op. cit. supra note 12, at Rule 240; WiGMoR, EVI§ 821 (acknowledgement of subordinate facts colorless with reference to actual
guilt).
40. See note 1 supra.
41. Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 327 U.S. 274 (1946) (defendant's statement that he
did not kill his wife but knew who did constituted "the equivalent of a confession"
of the crime charged-accessory before the fact to murder of wife).
42. Federal cases involving evidente secured by illegal searches and seizures are
analogous: Evidence obtained not by officers of the federal government but by others
DENCE

COMMENT
On principle it would seem that for a state to use a coerced confession would violate due process no matter who performed the coercion.
On the trustworthiness rationale, a confession is no more reliable when
extorted by one person than by another.43 On the basis of the policedeterrence principle, however, the confession would not be excluded, since
by hypothesis the police had nothing to do with obtaining the confession.
On the basis of self-incrimination, the confession also would not be
excluded as this privilege only protects one from official action. 44
Use of confession obtained by promises.
Thus far the Supreme Court has invoked the due process clause to
exclude confessions secured by unpleasant means-physical violence,
threats thereof, or interrogation amounting to phychological torture. It
is generally recognized that confessions obtained as a result of pleasanter
inducements-such as promises of pardon or of lighter punishment if
the suspect confesses-are likewise inadmissible. 45 The rationale is that
such confessions are untrustworthy. Suppose the confession is proved
trustworthy by independent evidence establishing its verity; would due
process be violated if a state admitted it?
While the policy of using the Fourteenth Amendment to civilize
state officials has been applied in extreme cases, such as those involving
physical violence and psychological torture, the Supreme Court probably would not use it to discipline state officials guilty only of making
promises likely to cause false confessions where (by hypothesis) the
confession is in fact shown to be true. At least one state has by statute
drawn a distinction between confessions given under the inducement of
fear and those given under other coercive circumstances. 46
cooperating with or instigated by them is excluded.

Byars v. McDowell, 273 U.S.

28 (1927).

43. AmFRICAN LAW INSTITUTE, op. cit. supra note 12, at Rule 505, draws no
distinction between state officials and others in cases of physical suffering or threats
thereof.

It may be, however, that if the confession were proved trustworthy by discovery
of independent facts establishing the truth of the confession, the confession would
be admissible since the police-deterrence and self-incrimination principles do not warrant
its exclusion.
44. But cf. Bram v. United States, 168 U.S. 532 (1897) (coerced confession'
obtained by foreign official excluded in federal court under Fifth Amendment privilege).
45. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §§834-836; AlmlcAN LAw INSTITUTE, op. cit. supra
note 12, Rule 505. The confession is excluded if the inducement was likely to cause a
false confession and if the inducement was given by a person reasonably believed by
the confessor to be in a position to carry out the promised inducement.
46. State v. Winters, 39 Wash.2d 545, 236 P.2d 1038 (1951), upholding WASH.
rv.
CODE 10.58.030 (1951): "The confession of a defendant made under inducement,
with all the circumstances, may be given as evidence against him, except when made
under the influence of fear produced by threats. .. ."

160
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Conclusion

Thus, it seems probable that the Supreme Court will outlaw some
present 'state practices in the area of confessions. It seems likely that
the almost universal state practice of authorizing the use in court of evidence obtained through leads furnished by coerced confessions will
eventually be forbidden. Use of coerced admissions falling short of
confessions, allowed by a number of states, will probably be condemned
as well. The Supreme Court's extension of its present rulings to these
new situations will not stamp out police lawlessness altogether, for there
will still be an incentive to coerce confessions and misrepresent the circumstances (thus having the confession admitted as voluntary); but such
an extension by the Supreme Court, armed with the due process clause,
should help to bring about a serious curtailment (and perhaps the ultimate
demise) of "third degree" methods presently employed by state enforcement agents.
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